The theme of this article is the predicamental category of relation in Thomas Aquinas, so that an understanding of the object of logic, which is a certain relation, can be made clear. In fact, the author considers the object of logic through the characteristic of pure reference to something else of every relational entity. This pure reference to something else, in logic, is indebted to certain ideal entities - the natural concepts themselves - as a function of which the ordering of the acts of the understanding is made possible.

Pedro Araújo

1 Introduction

Research into the object of logic must start with some clarifications about a few fundamental concepts in the classical tradition, without which this research cannot achieve its primary objective, which is to give intelligibility to the extremely important human activity of pure conceptual dealing. This is why identifying the object of logic as a certain relationship of reason (relatio rationis) must begin by expressly thematizing the most fundamental concepts of substance (substance) and accidents (accidents), since the category of relation is, as we know, a certain predicamental entity. Although, more strictly speaking, it is only through a contradistinction to real beings in general that the object of logic as such can be glimpsed, strictly speaking. If the category of relationship is, among all predicamental entities, as Thomas Aquinas points out in a well-known passage of the Summa contra Gentiles, the one who has minimum entityThe entity corresponding to the object of logic must be recognized as the smallest of all the minimum entitiesbecause it isn't, in fact, no real entity and, as we know, in the classical distinction concerning predicamental accidents, it is one of its conditions that predicamental entities have, of per seThis is why, strictly speaking, a study of the category of relation, in order to explain the object of logic, only reaches this object in a translational way. This is why, strictly speaking, a study of the category of relation, in order to explain for us the object of logic, achieves this object of inquiry only translationally, since, strictly speaking, the relation of logical reason should be understood as pairing pure privations (privations), such as death, darkness, etc., and pure negations (negations), such as nothingness. Consequently, we can conclude that the object of logic, before being any real thing (ens realis), it's for sure ideal thing (ens rationis), through which, however, the acts of the understanding can and must be organized.

2 The category of relationship (relatio) from the distinction between substance (substance) and accident (accidens)

Each and every entity, substance or accident, that possesses some reality falls into one of the supreme genres distinguished by Aristotle. Research into the metaphysical composition of real entities, which are divided into simple and composite substances, the material or formal principles from which they are formed, the notes that distinguish them and the ultimate foundation of their being, is certainly not the aim of this article. But it is necessary to study something of the category relation and its properties since the entity of reason that we have already identified as the object of logic is a specific type of relation, namely a relation of reason.

Thus, it is necessary to bear in mind that there is a twofold consideration of predicamental accidents: the first, insofar as we conceive in the accident its dependence on the substance in which it enters, i. e.If something is an accident, it must really be in the substance in which it is found. be The second, insofar as we apprehend from the accident that which distinguishes it from all other predicamental accidents, is what is called its formal reason, particular to each of the accidents, and by which we can distinguish each of the accidents from one another, guarding that common reason of inerring in substance, as Thomas Aquinas teaches:

Two things must be considered in each of the nine types of accident. The first is the being that belongs to each of the accidents as accidents. Thus, what is common to all of them is their inhering in one subject, since their accidental being consists in their being rooted in another. The second, that which can be considered in each of the accidents as a reason proper to each of them[1].

St. Thomas distinguishes between two things: accidental being and the proper reason for each of the accidents. Accidental existence implies an inherence in the substance in which it is inherent, but what is the way in which each of the different accidents exists? This we have by their specific formal reason, which requires by the very reason of accident that it actually inhales in the substance on which it depends. Real dependence on substance is the condition for the possibility of the existence of all accidents, with the exception of the accident of relation. For it is from the formal reason of the category of relation that its respectivity to, your point toIn other words, it is sufficient for the existence of any relationship to save the reference that the other thing maintains in itself, i. e.There can be a relationship without the relationship placing and determining something real in the things themselves:

The other genres, as such, put something into the nature of things (in fact, quantity, because of what makes it quantity, implies something), only relation, because of what makes it relation, doesn't have something to put into the nature of things, because it doesn't predicate something, but for something. This is why we find some relations that have nothing to do with the nature of things, but only with reason[2].

From the passage under study, we draw the conclusion that every accident puts something in the nature of things, with the exception of the relationship, i. e.The quantity or quality is directly determinative of something in the substance they determine; the relation, however, is determinative, although not only, given the existence of real relations, before this pure reference to something else[3]. In short, there are no quantities or qualities whose existence lies solely in reason, but this is not what we find in the predicamental category of relation, which is divided into real relation and relation of reason.

In the same line of reasoning, he goes on to distinguish what belongs to the formal reason proper to predicamental entities, such as quantity and quality, from mere respectivity which belongs to the formal reason of the category of relation:

Relation is distinguished from things of other genres by the fact that these things, by the very reason of the genre to which they belong, have something that makes them real things. Thus, quantity for the very reason of quantity has something that makes it real; and quality for the very reason of quality. But the relation as such does not have something that makes it a real thing for its own reason, which is respectivity to something else. There are, in fact, respective things that are not real, but only rational[4].

It's easy to see that the entity that specifies logic will be a specific type of relation of reason, v. g.According to St. Thomas, it is an entity that possesses a certain respectivity, although it does not put anything into the nature of things. Indeed, we put nothing into the thing when we create entities of reason such as genus and species, through which we compare four concepts: man, dog, species and animal. Indeed, as a dog is to a species of animal, so is man. Through this comparative act of four things, two real and two of reason, what is known spontaneously and naturally by man is organized in his understanding so that his natural desire for knowledge is satisfied. Indeed, we don't see entities named as "species" or "genus" walking around. We can easily draw the conclusion that the concepts of gender and species are a certain artifice of human reason, by which its natural concepts - the dog, the cat, the rhinoceros - can e must get organized.

So let's take note of this clarification by John of St. Thomas on some of the points we've been dealing with, so that the possibility of understanding the distinction between real relations and relations of reason proposed by St. Thomas is crystal clear:

In fact, real relations and relations of reason are distinguished insofar as one of the conditions required for relations to be real is missing, since this division is made on the basis of real relations. According to St. Thomas, five conditions are required: two on the subject side, two on the term side and one on the related side. On the subject side, that the subject be a real being e or at least that it has a real reason to be. On the side of the term, that the term is something real and actually existing, eOn the other hand, it is necessary that they be of the same order. On the side of the related, that they be of the same order, by default of which the relation of God to the creature is not a real relation, nor the relation of the measure to the measured, since it is of a different order... In short, all the difference between real relation and relation of reason formally and principally is reduced to the fact that the real relation has a real foundation with the coexistence of the terms, whereas the relation of reason lacks this foundation. (SAINT THOMAS, JOHN, 1930-1937, p. 569, our translation) [5].

The passage is full of consequences and is based on what St. Thomas says about the predicamental category of the relationship[6]. We have seen above and we have reason to conclude that the entity of reason that is the object that specifies logic is a certain relation of reason. From the conditions required and presented for a relation to be real, we find that, immediately, the relation that the logician deals with is one of reason since it does not meet at least the fifth condition on the side of the related: the related entities are not of the same order.

Both the printed species and the expressed species are certain perfections of the cognizing subject because they are direct likenesses of the real things themselves to which they immediately refer, and they also immediately fall into the category of quality, which, like every predicamental category, is a certain real being. Even if, before this perfective act, the relation of the things that measure the understanding to the understanding itself is a certain ideal relation, since the related are not of the same order in every relation of the measure to the measured. In other words, the things that measure the understanding exist independently of the fact that they have been the measure of it.

There is no contradiction here, there are two distinct relations in every relation of knowledge of real things, one is the relation of knowledge on the side of the thing that measures the understanding and the other is the relation of knowledge on the side of the understanding that is measured by the thing. So we have the relation of knowledge on the side of the thing, which is ideal, but is not the relation that logic deals with, which is also ideal but in another way, and the relation of knowledge on the side of the understanding, which is real, once the action of the understanding has been actualized, because every quality is determinative of something in the nature of things.

However, the entity of reason that is a certain relation of reason or ideal occurs from the predicamental accident of the quality, insofar as it is founded on and has as its foundation this respective accident, already insofar as it is a certain natural potency, i. e.This is the case of the intelligible species, the proximate foundation of the relation of reason that is the understanding, insofar as it refers to the real things themselves remotely, which occurs through the intelligible species that are predicamental accidents on which the operations of ordering by logic are carried out in the understanding itself. A more in-depth study of the Thomasian theory of knowledge is, of course, beyond the scope of this article.

Here we have to take into account the things we've already talked about above. The resemblance that is a consequence of knowledge is a certain convenience in form, which is a certain quality that inhere in the individual of knowledge, even after the act of becoming similar to the thing known; this does not occur in the relationship that the understanding maintains with the entities of reason, since the meaning of the terms "genus" and "species", as well as the meaning of the other terms of entities of reason, to which the understanding can become similar by its act of knowledge, does not correspond to anything in the thing. Hence, in the relation of reason, even though the remote foundation of the relation is real, i. e.If one of the conditions for the relationship to be real is missing, it will only be a certain relationship of reason or ideal:

Indeed, sometimes what is conceived by the intellect is the likeness of something existing outside the soul, such as the thing that is conceived by this name "man", and such a conception of the intellect has an immediate foundation in the thing, while it itself, by its conformity with the intellect, makes it true and causes the name that signifies the object understood to be said properly of the thing[7].

And then:

Sometimes, however, what is signified by a name is not the likeness of something existing outside the soul, but something that follows from the way of understanding it. And this is the case with the intentions that our intellect encounters (in the intellect itself when it considers things that exist outside the soul); for example, the meaning of this name "genus" is not the resemblance of something existing outside the soul, but because man intelligences animals as in many species, he attributes to them the intention of genus. In this way, although the proximate foundation of this intention of genus is the intellect and not the thing, nevertheless the remote foundation is the thing itself[8].

In this way, it is true that Socrates is an animal, and this is direct knowledge, but to conceive of the animal by the relation it maintains with many species and not in this or that really existing individual is something that follows only from the way of understanding things from the understanding. Now, every predicamental entity is real, with the exception of the relation justly and precisely according to the things we have examined. It is on the inner verb, insofar as it is taken by the logician on the basis of its orderliness, that the relation of logical reason is constituted, from which we can see that the foundation of this relation is real[9]However, since the formal principles on which the essence of the relation depends require that in order for the relation to be real, those related must be of the same order, then this logical relation will be one of reason.

The fact that there are relations of reason alongside properly real relations is due to the fact that the relation among all predicamental entities is the one that possesses the minimal entity, so that relations that are only of reason are placed alongside negation and privation when the entity in general is divided into real entities and entities of reason:

In fact, the relation that is adventitious to the substance has the last and most imperfect being. In fact, the fact that something is adventitious last is because it not only has as its condition the being of the substance, but also the being of the other accidents through which the relation is caused, just as the one in quantity causes equality, and the one in quality causes similarity. On the other hand, the fact that the being of the relation is very imperfect is based on the fact that the (formal) reason proper to the relation consists in its respectivity to something else, so that the being of the relation that is added to the substance not only depends on the being of the substance, but on the being of something outside it[10].

We mustn't confuse what St. Thomas wrote in the passage under study with what we mentioned earlier: that the foundation of the relationship must be something absolute. In fact, we saw above that the predicamental accidents on which the relationship is founded always imply aliquidSo it is to this something as a foundation that the relationship is added.

Thus, there are real relationships such as the relationship of order between two real things, which is the peaceful position of St. Thomas from what we have already seen[11]The relation of order produced by the logician in the understanding, insofar as it lacks any of the conditions for the relation to be a real relation, is only a relation of reason, since it is produced artificially through the entities of reason by and in the understanding itself, hence it is not a becoming similar to things immediately and in accordance with their real existence in themselves:

Insofar as it is a condition of the relation that it has two extremes, the relation can take place in three different ways, so that we have either a natural relation or a relation of reason. Sometimes, both extremes of the relationship are only of reason, since the order or relationship between them can only occur through a certain apprehension of reason, just as when we say that the same thing is identical to the same thing. In fact, when reason apprehends the same thing twice, it determines it as if there were two of them, and thus apprehends a certain relationship between the same thing and itself. And it's the same with all relations whose relatedness is real being on the one hand and non-being on the other. Reason forms these relations insofar as it apprehends non-being as a certain extreme. The same thing occurs in all relations that follow from an act of reason, such as between genus and species, and the like[12].

In the comparative act, just analyzed, of the relationship that understanding produces on the concepts of man e animal the order produced depends solely and fundamentally on this act of the understanding that apprehends the things known under the aspect of their orderliness, not in themselves and directly, but precisely so that they can be organized in the state they have in the understanding itself. Logic, as we have seen, is related to way of understanding (modus cognoscendi)things and not the consideration of how the very exercise of understanding things takes place, which is the object of study of natural philosophy and metaphysics. It is in this line of reasoning that St. Thomas attributes the relations of reason as the object of logic.

Conclusion

From the analytical path we have taken in this article, we can see certain characteristic notes of the concept of relatio that give intelligibility to its correlated concept of object of logic. In fact, this object must be recognized, after this study, as being identifiable as a very specific ratio relationshipSince, as we have proved, logical reason relations add to real relations a certain characteristic of artificialitywithout which logical relations cannot be constituted. In fact, logical relational entities are, in totum, ideals, and are so to a second power, unlike "natural" concepts such as man and dog, which are, however, presupposed by the activity of ordering the acts of the understanding by logic.

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[1] Id. S. T.., I, q. 28, a. 1 c.: "Considerandum est quod in quolibet novem generum accidentis est duo considerare. Quorum unum est esse quod competit unicuique ipsorum secundum quod est accidens. Et hoc communiter in omnibus est inesse subiecto, accidentis enim esse est inesse. Aliud quod potest considerari in unoquoque, est propria ratio uniuscuiusque illorum generum". The translations made, all by our own hands, were taken from the Leonine Edition, available at http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html (last accessed on 07/01/2024). The order of citation will be by the initials of the works consulted, followed by the reference to the parts of those works from which the quotation was taken. For other citations, we will follow the standard form of author and date.

[2] Id. De Ver, 1, 5 ad 16: "Alia genera, in quantum huiusmodi, aliquid ponant in rerum natura (quantitas enim ex hoc ipso quod quantitas est, aliquid dicit), sola relatio non habet, ex hoc quod est huiusmodi, quod aliquid ponat in rerum natura, quia non praedicat aliquid, sed ad aliquid. Unde inveniuntur quaedam relationes, quae nihil in rerum natura ponunt, sed in ratione tantum".

[3] Thus, a quantity that doesn't quantify anything doesn't exist, just as a quality that doesn't really qualify isn't something that exists in another as in a subject.

[4] Id. Quodl. I, 2, c: "Relationes differunt in hoc ab omnibus aliis rerum generibus, quia ea quae sunt aliorum generum, ex ipsa ratione sui generis habent quod sint res naturae, sicut quantitates ex ratione quantitatis, et qualitates ex ratione qualitatis; sed relationes non habent quod sint res naturae ex ratione respectus ad alterum. Inveniuntur enim quidam respectus qui non sunt reales, sed rationales tantum".

[5] "Relationes autem reales et rationis, quae divisio solum in relatione secundum esse invenitur, discriminantur penes carentiam alicuius ex conditionibus requisitis ad relationes reales. Requiruntur autem quinque conditiones a D. Thoma... duae ex parte subiecti, duae ex parte termini, una ex parte relatorum. Ex parte subiecti, quod subiectum sit ens reale et fundamentum seu rationem fundandi realem habeat. Ex parte termini, quod terminus sit res aliqua realis et realiter existens, et, secundo, quod sit distincta realiter ab alio extremo. Ex parte vero relativorum, quod sint eiusdem ordinis, defectu cuius Dei ad creaturam non est relatio realis nec mensurae ad mensuratum, si sit diversi ordinis... Formaliter tamen et principaliter reducitur tota differentia inter relationem realem et rationis, quod relatio realis habet fundamentum reale cum coexistentia termini, relatio rationis caret fundamentum".

[6] Basically in Question 28 of Part 1 of the Summa Theologica, cf. S. Theol, I, q. 28, a. 1 c.

[7] AQUINO, St. Thomas. In I Sent., 2, 1, 3 sol.Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine homo; et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, inquantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus et quod nomem significans illum intellectum proprie de re dicatur".

[8] Ibid: "Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam: et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum hujus nominis genus non est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis; et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa".

[9] The reality of the foundation of the ideal relation itself is none other than the very acts of the understanding distinguished in the first chapter as simple apprehension, judgment and reasoning, which are taken by the logician on the basis of their orderliness. Id. De Ver, 27, 4 s.c. 4: "Relatio autem semper fundatur super aliquid absolutum". ["In fact, the relationship is always based on something absolute"cf. Id. C. G. IV, 10, n. 7 a: "Nam relatio non potest esse absque aliquo absoluto... oportet quod habeat aliquod absolutum in quo fundetur". ["In fact, a relationship cannot take place without something absolute... it must have something absolute on which it is based."].

[10] Id. C. G.IV, 14, n. 12: "Relatio realiter substantiae adveniens et postremum et imperfectissimum esse habet: postremum quidem, quia non solum praeexigit esse substantiae, sed etiam esse aliorum accidentium, ex quibus causatur relatio, sicut unum in quantitate causat aequalitatem, et unum in qualitate similitudinem; imperfectissimum autem, quia propria relationis ratio consistit in eo quod est ad alterum, unde esse eius proprium, quod substantiae superaddit, non solum dependet ab esse substantiae, sed etiam ab esse alicuius exterioris".

[11] Id. S. T.I, 13, 7 c.: "Sciendum est quod quidam posuerunt relationem non esse rem naturae, sed rationis tantum. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum, ex hoc quod ipsae res naturalem ordinem et habitudinem habent ad invicem". ["It should be known that some claimed that the relationship is not a thing of nature, but only of reason, which is shown to be false by the fact that natural things themselves have order and conformity among themselves".].

[12] Id. S. T.I, 13, 7 c.: "Cum relatio requirat duo extrema, tripliciter se habere potest ad hoc quod sit res naturae et rationis. Quandoque enim ex utraque parte est res rationis tantum, quando scilicet ordo vel habitudo non potest esse inter aliqua, nisi secundum apprehensionem rationis tantum, utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem. Nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum, statuit illud ut duo; et sic apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum. Et similiter est de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non ens; quas format ratio, inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam extremum. Et idem est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur actum rationis, ut genus et species, et huiusmodi.